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How Does U.S. Monetary Policy Influence Sovereign
Spreads in Emerging Markets? 
VIVEK ARORA and MARTIN CERISOLA*
This paper quantifies the impact of changes in U.S. monetary policy on sovereign
bond spreads in emerging market countries. Specifically, the paper explores
empirically how country risk, as proxied by sovereign bond spreads, is influenced
by U.S. monetary policy, country-specific fundamentals, and conditions in global
capital markets. While country-specific fundamentals are important in explaining
fluctuations in country risk, the stance and predictability of U.S. monetary policy
are also important for stabilizing capital flows and capital market conditions in
emerging markets. [JEL E43, F36, G15]
T
he increased globalization of the world economy over the past decade has
been reflected in the increased dependence of emerging markets on devel-
opments in the U.S. economy. While the dramatic rise in capital flows to
emerging markets has been induced primarily by the implementation of sound
macroeconomic policies and wide structural reforms in these countries, it has
also been driven by changing conditions in industrial countries that have
encouraged investors to diversify their portfolios into developing country
assets. In particular, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) have emphasized
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countries,1 while others have also pointed to structural changes in institutional
portfolios in industrial countries, which led to a permanent increase in their
exposure to developing countries. 
The resumption of capital flows to developing countries during the 1990s
was accompanied by a dramatic decline in interest rate spreads but increased
countries’ vulnerability to sudden reversals in investors’ confidence and
increased turbulence. Some past episodes of market turbulence occurred at the
same time that the stance of U.S. monetary policy was being changed consid-
erably (for example, in 1994) or even precipitated changes in U.S. monetary
policy (for example, during the second half of 1998). Given the integration of
global capital markets, changes in U.S. monetary policy have been felt by
developing countries through effects on the cost and availability of funds, and
on their creditworthiness. 
In addition to the direct impact of changes in U.S. interest rates on rates in
developing countries, interest rate spreads (the differences between yields on
sovereign bonds of developing countries and U.S. treasury securities of
comparable maturities), which are a proxy for country risk, have tended to
move in the same direction as the changes in U.S. interest rates. This effect on
developing country spreads was seen clearly in 1994 when a tightening of U.S.
monetary policy was reflected in a substantial widening of spreads, and in
1998, when an easing of U.S. monetary policy in response to the flight to
quality and the concerns about a U.S. credit crunch associated with the
Russian default and the near demise of Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) helped to restore global liquidity conditions and to reduce sovereign
spreads somewhat.
This paper presents empirical evidence on how changes in U.S. monetary
policy influence country risk in several developing countries in Latin America,
Asia, and Eastern Europe. In particular, we examine empirically how country
risk, as proxied by sovereign bond spreads, is influenced by U.S. monetary
policy, country-specific fundamentals, and by conditions in world capital
markets. 
I. What Drives Sovereign Spreads in Emerging Markets?
From a theoretical perspective, a rise in U.S. policy interest rates could lead to an
increase in emerging market spreads for several reasons.2 To the extent that
emerging market bonds are risky (there is a probability of default), the yield on
emerging market bonds would have to rise by more than any rise in the risk-free
rate. To illustrate, if r and i represent the interest rate on the risk-free asset and
1Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) note that flows to Latin America, and developing countries
in general, during the early 1990s were triggered by “...falling interest rates, a continuing recession, and
balance of payments developments in the United States....”
2See Kamin and von Kleist (1999) for further discussion.Vivek Arora and Martin Cerisola
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the risky asset, respectively, and p is the probability of repayment on the risky
asset, then the equilibrium condition is:
(1)
The interest rate spread, S, defined as the difference between the rate on the risky
asset and on the risk-free asset, in equilibrium is then:
(2)
and its derivative with respect to r is (1 – p) / p, which is positive as long as p < 1.
This says that as long as there is some risk of default, the rate on the risky asset
will have to rise by more than any rise in the risk-free rate in order to compensate
investors for the risk. 
A rise in U.S. rates could also raise emerging market spreads through its
effects on the ability of debtor countries to repay loans. A rise in U.S. rates would
tend to increase debt-service burdens in borrowing countries, which would reduce
their ability to repay loans. In addition, as noted by Kamin and Kleist (1999), a
rise in U.S. rates could reduce investors’ appetite for risk, leading them to reduce
their exposure in risky markets, in turn reducing available financial resources in
borrowing countries. In terms of the above illustration, if the probability of repay-
ment is a negative function of the risk-free rate (p = p(r), with p  < 0), then the first
derivative of S with respect to r is:
(3)
which is positive (since p < 1 and p  < 0). This says that a rise in the risk-free rate
raises the spread both because of the risk of default (the first term) and because
that risk rises as the risk-free rate goes up (the second term). 
A number of relatively recent papers have explored the question of how
emerging market spreads are determined, including the role of macroeconomic
fundamentals and changes in market sentiment. Notwithstanding the straightforward
theoretical prediction and ample anecdotal evidence, the empirical literature on how
U.S. monetary policy has affected emerging market spreads is less conclusive. Most
of these analyses have tended to explore the role of global liquidity conditions, as
proxied by a specific yield on a U.S. treasury security, on sovereign bond spreads.
For example, in a study of 11 emerging market countries, Cline and Barnes (1997)
found a positive but statistically insignificant effect of U.S. treasury yields on
sovereign spreads during the mid-1990s. Kamin and von Kleist (1999) found no
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11 1 0 + ( ) =•+ ( ) +− ( ) • rp i p.statistically significant relationship between U.S. treasury rates and spreads for
selected emerging market countries, with the correlation being negative in some
cases. Eichengreen and Mody (1998a and 1998b) took these analyses further by
explicitly analyzing demand and supply factors in the market for emerging market
bonds. They found, for a sample of Latin American and East Asian countries during
the early 1990s, that a rise in U.S. treasury interest rates tended to reduce spreads,
and at the same time reduce the probability of a bond issue. The interpretation was
that a rise in U.S. rates deterred emerging country issuers from coming to the
market; with fewer issuers (who were likely to be of higher quality), prices rose and
spreads fell.3These results, however, may be sensitive to the nature of the underlying
data used in the analyses. These studies focused on sovereign spreads for new bond
issues (so-called launch spreads) rather than on spreads for bonds actively traded in
secondary markets. Also, some of the analyses cover a subperiod (1991–93) when
the market for sovereign bonds was developing, and another one (1994–95) when
shocks seriously restricted access to the market for lower quality issuers. 
This paper adds to the existing literature in three dimensions. First, rather than
examining spreads on new issues, we examine secondary market sovereign
spreads, which is the concept that is most common in public discussion and which,
as Eichengreen and Mody (1998a) note, can behave differently than launch
spreads, as they tend to be actively traded based on current and expected develop-
ments.4 Second, we isolate the impact of U.S. monetary policy by explicitly incor-
porating the U.S. federal funds target rate as an explanatory variable instead of the
yield on a U.S. treasury security. Most of the specifications adopted so far have
been somewhat simplistic, proxying U.S. monetary policy by the yield on U.S.
treasury securities. However, shocks to U.S. treasury yields are not necessarily the
result of changes in U.S. monetary policy. As seen in Figure 1, while the yield on
the three-month U.S. treasury bill has in general fluctuated in tandem with the
U.S. federal funds target rate, there have been many instances when these two
rates have departed from each other. A recent instance was the so-called flight to
quality during the Asian crisis, when U.S. treasury bill yields fluctuated dramati-
cally even in the absence of changes in U.S. monetary policy. The level of the U.S.
federal funds target rate is thus a more direct measure than the yield on U.S. trea-
sury securities. Third, as discussed below, we explicitly analyze the role of market
volatility, including uncertainty about U.S. monetary policy actions. In doing so,
we present an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH)–based
measure of volatility that escapes criticisms that apply to more commonly used
measures.
Clearly, from a theoretical and empirical point of view, changes in U.S.
interest rates, or likewise in global liquidity conditions, would be expected to
influence positively country risk and sovereign spreads in developing countries.
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3Cline and Barnes (1997) pointed out in addition that falling U.S. interest rates are generally associ-
ated with an abundance of capital in international markets, which tends to drive down yields.
4Earlier analyses based on secondary market developments include Dooley, Fernandez-Arias, and
Kletzer (1996) and Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996). These papers found a significant negative
impact of industrial-country interest rates on secondary market prices of emerging market debt.While Eichengreen and Mody (1998a and 1998b) found that a tightening of global
liquidity conditions (as proxied by the 10-year U.S. treasury bond yield) tended to
reduce sovereign spreads in emerging markets, as noted earlier, their result may be
largely explained by the nature of the underlying data used in their analyses and
by the sample period (1991–95), which covers the 1991–93 subperiod when the
market for sovereign bonds was at a very early stage of development and when
shocks seriously restricted access to the market for lower quality issuers.
We started by replicating the methodology of earlier studies, but using
secondary market data. We estimated the following model individually for a group
of emerging markets. The model was estimated for Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, Poland, and
Thailand for the period 1994–99 (with a few exceptions due to data limitations).
We adopted the following standard linear relationship:
(4)
which aims at explaining fluctuations in the logarithm of sovereign spreads as a
function of the log of the level of the yield on the 10-year U.S. treasury bond
(ustnote) and country-specific macroeconomic variables (Z), where α and η are
parameters to be estimated and ω is the error term. As for country-specific funda-
mentals, we selected a set of macroeconomic variables that have traditionally been
used in the literature exploring fluctuations in sovereign spreads. In particular, the
variables chosen were the fiscal balance, the net foreign asset position of the
log log spread ustnote Z t tt t ( ) = ( ) ++ αη ω ,















Figure 1. Emerging Market Sovereign Spreads and U.S. Interest Rates
Logarithm Percent
U.S. federal funds target rate
(right scale)
U.S. three-month treasury bill yield
(right scale)
Merill Lynch global emerging 
markets spread
(left scale)banking system, central government external debt, and total external debt (all
expressed as a ratio to GDP), the debt-service ratio, and the ratio of gross interna-
tional reserves to imports. However, more recent studies, such as Kaminsky,
Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), have empha-
sized the need to identify key macroeconomic and financial variables that may
provide some early warning signals of banking and currency crises, and the role
of other fundamental factors in driving banking and currency crises. Kaminsky,
Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997) propose a set of variables that track more effectively
the emergence of a crisis, such as deviations of the real exchange rate from trend,
equity prices, and the ratio of broad money to gross international reserves. These
additional variables, which are not part of our estimation, are worth exploring in
future research.
The results, presented in Table 1, confirm that there is a positive relationship
between sovereign spreads in secondary markets and the yield on U.S. treasury
securities.5 Evidently, the main difference from Eichengreen and Mody’s study
seems to be related to the use of secondary rather than primary sovereign bond
spreads. In addition, the results show that the level of the 10-year U.S. treasury
note yield has a significant positive effect on sovereign spreads, with a mean group
elasticity estimated at 0.78 and a mean standard error of 0.36.
While the above analysis suggests that the U.S. 10-year treasury note
yield—a proxy for global liquidity conditions—tends to influence positively
secondary market sovereign bond spreads, more direct measures of U.S. mone-
tary policy—such as the U.S. federal funds rate—and a model-driven proxy for
market volatility may help to explain better fluctuations in sovereign bond
spreads.
What Is Market Turbulence and How Do We Proxy It?
Several authors have emphasized that, in addition to country-specific fundamen-
tals, changes in market sentiment have been important in driving fluctuations in
emerging market sovereign spreads (see, for example, Cantor and Packer (1996),
Eichengreen and Mody (1998a and 1998b), and Kamin and von Kleist (1999)).
These changes in market sentiment have often been sudden and abrupt, and have
led many authors to argue that these changes in sentiment have been manifested
by some form of market turbulence or “contagion” of shocks from one country to
another, which has driven down sovereign debt prices or widened spreads. Baig
and Goldfajn (2001) have analyzed the contagion from Russia to Brazil during
1998, while Edwards and Susmel (2000) have explored how changes in financial
volatility, particularly interest rate volatility, have affected countries that suppos-
edly have experienced market turbulence or contagion.
While some authors have argued that these episodes of market turbulence have
to some extent reflected evidence of “irrational investor behavior,” others have
tried to explain these episodes primarily as “liquidity events.” In particular,Valdés
U.S.MONETARY POLICY AND EMERGING MARKET SPREADS
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5These regressions are based on the 10-year U.S. treasury note yield, as used by Eichengreen and























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.(1997) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) have emphasized the financial aspects
of contagion. Kaminsky and Reinhart noted the role of international bank lending
and cross-market hedging as sources of contagion based on fundamentals. Valdés
argued that contagion results primarily from the interaction of investors who face
liquidity constraints and who have invested in emerging market assets that are
potentially highly illiquid. When facing liquidity needs in one particular class of
asset or country, such investors would tend to withdraw liquidity from some other
class or country. 
In the same vein, others have emphasized the importance of liquidity
effects on capital flows and asset prices in emerging markets, which on certain
occasions may have been associated with sudden and unexpected changes in
U.S. monetary policy.6 For example, during the first half of 1994, the U.S.
Federal Reserve raised the federal funds rate by 125 basis points, which precip-
itated a sharp unwinding of highly leveraged positions by hedge funds, propri-
etary traders, and institutional investors, which had been financing purchases of
long-term treasury securities with short-term borrowing. This unwinding of
positions contributed to and exacerbated a steep correction in emerging
sovereign bond markets. In sum, what these authors suggest is that a need for
liquidity, precipitated by a rise in U.S. interest rates or other exogenous shock,
becomes one of the main transmission vehicles of financial turmoil across
assets and countries.
In terms of how to model turbulence or volatility, several approaches have
been tested in the literature. Most approaches have used statistical measures based
on standard errors for a certain variable that was considered as relevant in
capturing the market turbulence or contagion. For example, the work of
Hardouvelis (1989) in exploring the link between the level of margin requirements
and stock market volatility in the United States was based on a moving average
representation for volatility of real stock returns. More recent studies
(Hardouvelis, Pericli, and Theodossiou, 1997) have proxied market volatility by
computing the standard deviation of daily returns during a month. This volatility
measure, which is based on daily data, is constructed in a way that tends to avoid
data overlapping, and its associated problems, by being sampled every month.
Other more advanced techniques have aimed at estimating conditional volatility
and have been based on Schwert’s (1989) procedure and on the ARCH model
developed by Engle (1982). With these methods in mind, we proxied market
volatility by computing different statistical and econometric measures on the
spread between the yield on the three-month U.S. treasury bill and the U.S. federal
funds target rate. In principle, the yield on the three-month U.S. treasury bill can
be considered a key short-term risk-free rate that usually serves as a benchmark
for pricing other high-yield assets in world capital markets, and that would most
likely reflect changes in global liquidity and economic conditions. More impor-
tant, changes in the spread between the three-month treasury bill yield and the
U.S.MONETARY POLICY AND EMERGING MARKET SPREADS
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6See IMF (1995a, 1995b, and 1996) for a more detailed analysis and account of events.U.S. federal funds target rate may capture heightened uncertainty about the
expected stance of U.S. monetary policy, as in the first half of 1994.7
All the different proxies for market volatility tend to show increased market
turbulence during 1994 and in the second half of 1998 (Figure 2). A scatter plot
shows that a proxy based on a six-month moving average of standard deviations
for the spread between the three-month yield on the U.S. treasury bill and the
federal funds target rate was highly statistically significant in explaining fluctua-
tions in sovereign spreads across countries (Figure 3). The validity of this proxy
for volatility, however, has been questioned in the empirical literature by Hsieh
and Miller (1990), who argue that it induces a spurious correlation between vari-
ables due to its high serial correlation. The construction of this proxy using
moving averages leads to strong autocorrelation, which leads to highly problem-
atic statistical inference. Therefore, regressing a highly autocorrelated series, such
as the proxy for market turbulence, on other variables can produce a significant
coefficient, even when no true relationship exists. The clustering of observations
in Figure 3 would suggest that, were these observations independent, a strong
direct relationship would be found between sovereign spreads and the proxy for
volatility. The R2 is quite high, at close to 30 percent.8 In fact, these observations
are far from independent, and the high positive correlation between sovereign
spreads and the proxy for market volatility is primarily the result of the way the
proxy was constructed.9 Nevertheless, in our empirical estimates, we used these
proxies for market volatility in estimating the model, and the results are clearly
sensitive to the chosen proxy.10 Given the constraints and limitations of the first
two proxies for market turbulence noted above, however, we decided to use the
fitted values for the conditional standard error from an ARCH model for the spread
between the three-month yield on the U.S. treasury bill and the federal funds target
rate. As is well established in the literature,ARCH models are useful in analyzing
financial data because they capture the persistence in volatility that is observed in
many financial time series. In particular, large shocks tend to be followed by large
shocks of unpredictable sign, suggesting that there is persistence in market
volatility and that it tends to vary over time. As seen in Figure 4, the positive rela-
tionship between spreads and market volatility looks significantly different from
the one presented in Figure 3 once one allows for a proxy that minimizes data
overlapping and serial correlation. In fact, there is less of a positive correlation
between the variables, as the R2 declines to only 8 percent.
Vivek Arora and Martin Cerisola
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7It is also evident, however, that changes in this spread may not necessarily fully reflect expected
changes in the stance of U.S. monetary policy, as was demonstrated during the Asian crisis and, to some
extent, during the events associated with the default by Russia and the near demise of LTCM during the
second half of 1998. Cline and Barnes (1997) and Kamin and von Kleist (1999) use short-term interest
rates as a proxy for global liquidity conditions. Eichengreen and Mody (1998a and 1998b) use the yield
on the 10-year U.S. treasury bond as a proxy for global economic conditions.
8The alternative proxy suggested by Hardouvelis, Pericli, and Theodossiou (1997), the standard devi-
ation of the daily spread within a month, is not presented in the paper because it was not statistically
significant in most equations, except in those for Argentina, Bulgaria, and Indonesia.
9Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the autocorrelation coefficient is not highly persistent, as it
declines to almost zero at the fourth lag.
10When using the six-month moving average proxy for market volatility, the econometric estimates






















Figure 2. Alternative Proxies for Market Volatility
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Figure 3. Sovereign Spreads and Moving-Average-Based Market Volatility
R2 = 0.28Econometric Evidence
The econometric model for sovereign bond spreads presented in the previous
section was modified by explicitly including the U.S. federal funds target rate and
a proxy for market volatility. The model, which was estimated individually for the
same group of countries, is as follows:11
(5)
The model aims at explaining fluctuations in the logarithm of sovereign spreads as
a function of the level of the U.S. federal funds target rate (ffr), the proxy for
market volatility (mktvol) derived from an ARCH model, and country-specific
macroeconomic variables (Z), where ρ , λ , and θ are parameters to be estimated,
and e is the error term.12 As explained before, the proxy for market volatility is
log log spread ffr mktvol Z e t tt t t ( ) = ( ) ++ + ρλ θ.
Vivek Arora and Martin Cerisola
484






0123 5 6 79 8 10 4
R2 = 0.08
11We did not believe panel data estimation would have been more efficient than the chosen procedure.
As the results show, homogeneity in the estimated parameters is highly rejected, as parameters differ
significantly across countries and even within regions. With a relatively small number of countries and a
large number of observations, it is more efficient to estimate the model for each country separately rather
than impose some form of homogeneity through panel data estimation. In addition, panel data estimation
would have severely restricted the sample period, given that data for most Asian countries were available
starting only in 1997.
12An alternative proxy for U.S. monetary policy is the federal funds futures rate. In using the target
(spot) rate, we thought that market expectations of the federal funds rate would be reflected in the spot
yield on the three-month treasury bill, and as a result our proxy for market volatility would indirectly
capture expectations about U.S. monetary policy.intended to capture changes in investor sentiment which may be related to
expected changes in U.S. monetary policy. It may also pick up the effects of other
market-related events, such as the flight to quality effects during the Asian crisis.
In line with the previous model, the results show that the level of the U.S.
federal funds target rate has significant positive effects on emerging market
spreads, with the mean group elasticity estimated at 0.82 (Table 2).13 The esti-
mated elasticities vary considerably across countries (the standard error for the
mean group estimate is 0.35): the estimates for Argentina, Colombia, Panama, and
the Philippines are smaller than the average; the estimates for Brazil, Mexico, and
Bulgaria are close to 1; and those for Korea and Poland appear to be very high
given their past macroeconomic performance and low indebtedness.14
Nevertheless, the results suggest that the estimated impact of changes in the U.S.
federal funds rate on sovereign spreads is slightly higher (but economically not
significant) than the one estimated for the yield on the 10-year U.S. treasury bond. 
The model also supports the view that increased market volatility, which may
be related to heightened uncertainty about the expected path of U.S. monetary
policy, has significant positive effects on spreads across countries and regions.
However, a significant proportion of fluctuations in emerging market spreads is
driven by country-specific fundamentals. In particular, the results suggest that
improved macroeconomic fundamentals, such as higher net foreign assets (in
terms of GDP or imports), lower fiscal deficits, and lower ratios of debt service to
exports and debt to GDP, help to lower sovereign spreads. For example, a higher
net foreign asset position contributed to lower spreads in many Latin American
and Asian countries—particularly those that had in place fixed exchange rate
regimes and where lender-of-last-resort considerations seemed particularly impor-
tant—such as Argentina, Panama, Thailand, and Korea. Foreign indebtedness
appears to contribute positively to sovereign spreads, especially in Latin America
(particularly Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and Panama), the Philippines, and to some
extent Poland, all countries that underwent comprehensive debt reschedulings in
the past. 
The model presented in Table 2 explains fluctuations in emerging market
sovereign spreads relatively well for most countries (see Figure A1 in the
appendix). In particular, the model explains roughly between half and three-quar-
ters of the fluctuations in spreads for most countries, and for most countries (9 out
of 11) the adjusted R2 increases significantly. In addition, using the Phillips-Perron
(1988) test, we do not reject the hypothesis that sovereign spreads are cointegrated
with the chosen country-specific fundamentals, the U.S. federal funds rate, and the
U.S.MONETARY POLICY AND EMERGING MARKET SPREADS
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13Needless to say, the rise in the level of emerging market interest rates will not  necessarily be as
large as the sum of the rise in spreads and the rise in the U.S. federal funds rate. In the United States, the
yield curve tends to flatten as monetary policy is tightened, so that a rise in short-term interest rates is
usually not fully passed through to longer-term rates.
14The results for Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, especially the size of the U.S. interest rate elasticity,
should be interpreted with some caution due to the relatively small sample size and the fact that the esti-
mation mainly covers the period of an IMF arrangement. In the case of Poland, the model did not include
any measure of indebtedness due to the lack of a time series from 1994, and as a result, may be biasing














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.proxy for market volatility in 8 out of 11 countries, with the models for Brazil,
Poland, and the Philippines rejecting the hypothesis of cointegration. This may be
partly related to the finding that the model is subject to a structural break in late
1995 in several countries (see FigureA2 in the appendix). Specifically, in the cases
of Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Mexico, the Philippines, and Poland, the model
fails to fully account for the sharp narrowing of spreads that took place during the
period leading up to the Asian crisis. The narrowing of sovereign spreads between
the first half of 1996 and mid-1997 was particularly pronounced in these countries,
and may have been associated more with changes in market access and with global
portfolio shifts by institutional investors than with country-specific fundamentals.
These results seem to suggest that some form of “contagion” may have also
contributed to narrowing rather than widening sovereign spreads for a group of
developing countries during this period.
Global Liquidity Conditions and Other Factors at Work
Following the Mexican financial crisis of 1994–95, there was a large compression
of emerging market sovereign spreads, which declined from a peak close to 1,600
basis points in March 1995 to about 325 basis points in July 1997 (see Figure 1).
In fact, as noted by some analysts, the international bond market experienced,
between end-1994 and early 1996, one of the greatest rallies in its recent history.15
Such a compression in sovereign spreads for U.S. dollar-denominated bonds was
driven by supply as well as demand factors. On the supply side,Andrews and Ishii
(1995) noted that developing countries shifted the currency denomination of bond
issues away from the U.S. dollar to issues denominated in deutsche marks and
Japanese yen. In fact,Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico became very active in issuing
yen-denominated bonds in the Euro-yen and Japanese markets (Figure 5). Access
by developing countries to the alternative currency issues was eased by the dereg-
ulation of the yen-denominated market, which eliminated restrictions on the sale
of sovereign yen-denominated Eurobond issues to Japanese investors in 1994, and
reduced the minimum credit rating requirement in 1996, from investment to
noninvestment grade for any sovereign issuer of Samurai bonds. On the demand
side, interest rates in industrial countries declined markedly and were at extremely
low levels in Japan, Germany, and France for a considerable period of time (Figure
6), while several of the Latin American countries, particularly Mexico, faced a
rapid recovery in macroeconomic fundamentals. All these factors may have
contributed to restoring investors’ confidence rapidly, boosting global liquidity,
and renewing the demand for new bond issues by developing countries
It is difficult to assess whether the failure of our model to fully account for the
sharp compression in spreads in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Bulgaria, Poland, and
the Philippines, particularly between mid-1996 and mid-1997, reflects the omis-
sion or inadequate account of country-specific fundamentals rather than the
inability to capture global changes (including global liquidity conditions, portfolio
shifts, or momentum strategies by institutional investors). Nevertheless, we
Vivek Arora and Martin Cerisola
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suspect that global liquidity factors may have been at work given that the failure
to predict such narrowing of spreads is primarily confined to a group of developing
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Figure 5. Sovereign Bond Issues in Yen-Denominated Debt
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Germanyan asset class.16 To capture some of these effects, particularly the structural
changes associated with the liberalization of the yen-denominated bond market,
we extended the model by including the Hodrick-Prescott cyclical component of
the number of yen-denominated sovereign bond issues by emerging-market coun-
tries during this period. A significant (but very small) negative effect was found
for some of those countries, particularly Argentina and Mexico, while the rest of
the results remained largely unchanged.17
II. Conclusions
This paper presented empirical evidence on how U.S. monetary policy has influ-
enced country risk in several developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and
Eastern Europe. In contrast to previous results in the literature, but consistent with
what we might anticipate from theory, our results suggest that the level of U.S.
interest rates has direct positive effects on sovereign bond spreads. In addition, the
econometric evidence supports the view that, while country-specific fundamentals
are extremely important in determining country risk, so is the stance and
predictability of U.S. monetary policy. 
An approach to U.S. monetary policy that provides financial markets with
clear indications of policymakers’ views about the balance of inflationary risks
and intentions is likely to reduce the negative impact of a rise in U.S. interest rates
on country risk in developing countries. More important, policymakers in devel-
oping countries still enjoy a significant degree of freedom to influence country risk
and economic growth. Country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals, such as a
sound and sustainable fiscal policy and low indebtedness, are extremely important
in reducing country risk and domestic interest rates, factors that are highly
conducive to fostering sustainable economic growth. 
The search for the best proxies for U.S. monetary policy, market volatility, and
country-specific fundamentals is a complicated task and we do not claim to have
found the true underlying model. Evidently, several different options are available
to model any of the fundamental factors determining country risk. In particular,
future research could explore the role of the U.S. federal funds futures, rather than
the target level, as a proxy for U.S. monetary policy, while some of the early
warning indicators of currency crises can be included in the set of country-specific
fundamentals.
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16See Aitken (1998), and Borensztein and Gelos (2000) for empirical evidence on the role played by
shifts in institutional investors’ sentiment in determining asset prices in developing countries.
17The results are available upon request.APPENDIX
Data Description
Data on sovereign bond spreads for each country were obtained from Merrill Lynch and are
based on its IGOV Index. The U.S. target federal funds rate and the three-month U.S. treasury
bill rate were obtained from the U.S. Federal Reserve system. 
Country-specific data were based on information provided by national authorities. Several
data series were available on a monthly basis, but some (including GDP) were available only
on a quarterly basis, and a few only on an annual basis. Quarterly and annual data were
converted to a monthly basis using a cubic spline interpolation. 
Data definitions are as follows:
Net foreign assets (NFA) NFA of the banking system, in percent of GDP.
Fiscal balance Budget balance of the central or federal government,
defined in percent of GDP.
Gross reserves to imports Gross international reserves as a percent of imports of 
goods and nonfactor services.
Debt-service ratio External debt service as a percent of exports of goods and
nonfactor services.
Central government debt External debt of the central or federal government, in 
percent of GDP.
Total external debt External debt of the private and public sectors, in 
percent of GDP.
Details on the estimation period and data availability for individual countries are as follows:
Argentina
Estimation period:April 1994–December 1999. NFA: monthly. Central government debt: quar-
terly starting in the fourth quarter of 1996 and annually for earlier periods.
Brazil
Estimation period: April 1994–December 1999. Fiscal balance: quarterly. Central government
debt: quarterly.
Bulgaria
Estimation period: June 1995–December 1999. NFA: monthly. Debt-service ratio: quarterly
starting in the fourth quarter of 1996 and annually for earlier periods.
Colombia
Estimation period: April 1997–December 1999. NFA: quarterly. Data refer to the NFA of the
financial sector. Central government data: annual.
Indonesia
Estimation period: May 1997–December 1999. Fiscal balance: quarterly.
U.S.MONETARY POLICY AND EMERGING MARKET SPREADS
491Korea
Estimation period: July 1998–December 1999. NFA: monthly.
Mexico
Estimation period: April 1994–December 1999. Gross reserves/imports: monthly. Central
government debt: quarterly.
Panama
Estimation period: August 1996–December 1999. NFA: quarterly. Fiscal balance: quarterly.
Total external debt: quarterly.
Philippines
Estimation period:April 1994–December 1999. Gross reserves/imports: quarterly. Debt-service
ratio: quarterly. Central government debt: quarterly.
Poland
Estimation period: November 1994–December 1999. NFA: monthly. Gross reserves/imports:
monthly.
Thailand
Estimation period: November 1997–December 1999. NFA: monthly. Debt-service ratio:
annual. 
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Figure A1. Sovereign Spreads in Selected Emerging Markets,  
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1Based on the cumulative sum of squared residuals statistic. Confidence bands for a 95 percent level of significance.REFERENCES
Aitken, B., 1998, “Have Institutional Investors Destabilized Emerging Markets?”
Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 16, pp. 173–84.
Andrews, D., and Ishii, S., 1995, “The Mexican Financial Crisis:A Test of the Resilience of the
Markets for Developing Country Securities,” IMF Working Paper 95/132 (Washington:
International Monetary Fund).
Baig, T., and I. Goldfajn, 2001, “The Russian Default and the Contagion to Brazil,” in
International Financial Contagion, ed. by S. Claessens and K. Forbes (Boston: Kluwer
Academic Publishers).
Borensztein, E., and G. Gelos, 2000, “A Panic-Prone Pack? The Behavior of Emerging Market
Mutual Funds,” IMF Working Paper 00/198 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Calvo, G., L. Leiderman, and C. Reinhart, 1993, “Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rate
Appreciation in Latin America: The Role of External Factors,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 40,
No. 1, pp. 108–51.
———, 1996, “Inflows of Capital to Developing Countries in the 1990s,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 123–39.
Cantor, R., and F. Packer, 1996, “Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings,”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review (October), pp. 37–53.
Cline, W., and K. Barnes, 1997, “Spreads and Risk in Emerging Markets Lending,” Working
Paper 97-1 (Washington: Institute of International Finance).
Dooley, M., E. Fernandez-Arias, and K. Kletzer, 1996, “Is the Debt Crisis History? Recent
Private Capital Inflows to Developing Countries,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10,
pp. 27–50.
Edwards, S., and R. Susmel, 2000, “Interest Rate Volatility and Contagion in Emerging
Markets: Evidence from the 1990s,” NBER Working Paper 7813 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
Eichengreen, B., and A. Mody, 1998a “Interest Rates in the North and Capital Flows to the
South: Is There a Missing Link?”, International Finance, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 35–57.
———, 1998b, “What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging-Market Debt: Fundamentals
or Market Sentiment?,” NBER Working Paper 6408 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National
Bureau of Economic Research, February.
Engle, R., 1982, “Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity with Estimates of the Variance
of United Kingdom Inflation,” Econometrica, Vol. 50, pp. 987–1001.
Hamilton, J., 1994, Time Series Analysis (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press).
Hardouvelis, G., 1989, “Margin Requirements, Volatility, and the Transitory Component of
Stock Prices,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Paper 8909.
———, A. Pericli, and P. Theodossiou, 1997, “The Asymmetric Relation Between Initial
Margin Requirements and Stock Market Volatility Across Bull and Bear Markets,” CEPR
Discussion Paper Series No. 1746 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research).
Hsieh, D., and Miller, M., 1990, “Margin Regulation and Stock Market Volatility,” Journal of
Finance, Vol. 45 (March), pp. 3–30.
International Monetary Fund, 1995a, International Capital Markets (Washington: International
Monetary Fund).
———, 1995b, Private Market Financing for Developing Countries (Washington:
International Monetary Fund).
———, 1996, International Capital Markets (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
U.S.MONETARY POLICY AND EMERGING MARKET SPREADS
497Kamin, S., and K. von Kleist, 1999, “The Evolution and Determinants of Emerging Market
Credit Spreads in the 1990s,” Working Paper No. 68 (Basel: Bank for International
Settlements).
Kaminsky, G., S. Lizondo, and C. Reinhart, 1997, “Leading Indicators of Currency Crises,”
Policy Research Working Paper 1852 (Washington: World Bank).
Kaminsky, G., and C. Reinhart, 1998, “Financial Crises in Asia and Latin America: Then and
Now,” American Economic Review, Vol. 88 (May), pp. 444–48.
———, 2000, “On Crises, Contagion, and Confusion,” Journal of International Economics,
Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 145–68.
MacKinnon, J., 1991, “Critical Values for Cointegration Tests,” in  Long-Run Economic
Relationships: Readings in Cointegration, ed. by R.J. Engle and C.W.J. Granger (New
York: Oxford University Press).
Phillips, P.C.B., and P. Perron, 1988, “Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression,”
Biometrika, Vol. 75, pp. 335–46.
Schwert, G., 1989, “Tests for Unit Roots: A Monte Carlo Investigation,” Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics, Vol. 7, pp. 147–59.
Valdés, R., 1997, “Emerging Market Contagion: Evidence and Theory,” Working Paper Series
No. 7 (Santiago: Central Bank of Chile).
Vivek Arora and Martin Cerisola
498